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Note
COMPETITIVE BIDDING AND THE OPTION
TO RENEW OR EXTEND A
STATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The general principle requiring competitive bidding before
awarding a government contract is well accepted in nearly every
state in one form or another. Two recent Washington cases, Miller
v. State' and Savage v. State,2 have raised the question of whether
a state purchase contract which is initially let in accordance
with competitive bidding requirements violates these same require-
ments by providing for negotiated renewal or by including an
option in the state to extend the duration of the contract beyond
its original term. This Note will consider the problems presented
by both the negotiated renewal and the extension option. It will
analyze Savage v. State in light of a survey of the major aspects of
state government purchasing contracts.
II. MILLER V. STATE-THE NEGOTIATED RENEWAL
The State of Washington in 1957 called for competitive bids
to supply all of the light bulbs required by the state during a twelve
month period.3 A total of twelve firms entered bids on the con-
tract. In compliance with the applicable statutory requirements,
the one year contract was awarded in 1958 to the lowest and best
1. 73 Wash. 2d 790, 440 P.2d 840 (1968).
2. 75 Wash. 2d 633, 453 P.2d 613(1969).
3. "Light bulbs are no trifling matter to the state of Washington.
The state buys nearly $300,000 worth each biennium-and the amount will
increase steadily in the future." Miller v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 790, 440
P.2d 840, 841 (1968).
Note
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bidder, the Platt Electric Supply, Inc. Thereafter, instead of
putting the light bulb purchases up for competitive bids, the state
regularly renewed the 1958 contract with the supplier by nego-
tiation.
4
The state's renewal practice led to the institution of a taxpay-
ers' action to enjoin the State and the Director of General Ad-
ministration from further renewing the 1958 lamp purchase con-
tract. The lower court granted the relief sought5 after finding
the following facts:
That the discounts contained in said lamp contract No.
184 are substantially less then [sic] discounts presently
available from a number of suppliers in the State of Wash-
ington, and that the Platt Electric Supply, Inc., gives higher
discount rates in a number of instances to users under
somewhat similar contracts, including the City of Seattle,
City of Tacoma, the County of Multnomah School District,
the State of Oregon and the Directors of King County.
That the State of Washington is not receiving the ad-
vantage of the best available prices, including discounts,
in the purchase of lamps under contract No. 184.6
While the state disputed the lower court's findings of fact,
its main contention on appeal was that the statutory provisions
relating to competitive bidding T gave it a wide latitude to nego-
tiate contracts for the purchase of state supplies, or to renew by
negotiation contracts reached by competitive bids, because the stat-
ute directed that purchases be made by competitive bidding only
4. Id. at 791, 440 P.2d at 841.
5. A judgment and decree of injunction was entered against the
defendants by the Superior Court of Washington for Thurston County.
6. Finding of fact 6 of the lower court is quoted in a footnote in the
Miller opinion. 73 Wash. 2d 790, 791, 440 P.2d 840, 841 (1968).
7. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 43.19.1906 (1965) provides:
Insofar as practicable, all purchases and sales shall be based on
competitive bids and a formal sealed bid procedure shall be used
as standard procedure for all purchases and contracts for pur-
chases and sales executed by the director of general administra-
tion through the division of purchasing and .under the powers
granted by RCW 43.19.190 through 43.19.1393: Provided, That
sealed competitive bidding shall not be necessary for:
(1) Emergency purchases if such sealed bidding procedure
would prevent or hinder the emergency from being met
appropriately; and
(2) Purchases not exceeding five hundred dollars but in all
such purchases quotations shall be secured from enough
vendors to assure establishment of a competitive price;
and
(3) Purchases which are clearly and legitimately limited to a
single source of supply and purchases involving special
facilities, services, or market, conditions, in which in-
stances the purchase price may be best established -by
direct negotiation.
'insofar as practicable.' 8 The state further suggested that calling
for bids would not be necessary when the purchasing officer, in
the exercise of his discretion, determined that to do so would be
impracticable.
The Supreme Court of Washington rejected the state's argu-
ment for two basic reasons. First, it determined that the instant
contract did not fall within one of the statutory exceptions 9 to the
general competitive bidding requirement. These statutory excep-
tions, which are some of those typically present in the competitive
bidding rules of other states, exempt from the general require-
ment emergency purchases, purchases falling below a minimum
figure (in this case $500), and purchases limited to a single source
of supply. 10 Clearly none of these exceptions applied to the con-
tract in question.
Second, after reviewing the advantages to the public inherent
in the competitive bidding procedure and defining the term prac-
ticable,1 the court concluded that it would not be impracticable
for the state to purchase its light bulb supplies through com-
petitive bidding.
In so concluding, the court effectively and correctly decided
that a negotiated renewal of a contract originally awarded in
accordance with competitive bidding requirements is void as vio-
lating those same requirements.
1II. SAVAGE V. STATE-THE EXTENSION OPTION
In response to the decree of the trial court in Miller enjoining
the state from negotiating further renewals of the 1958 lamp con-
tract, the state called for competitive bids for the furnishing of
electric lamps, light bulbs and starters. The new contract was
awarded to the lowest bidder, once again the Platt Electric Sup-
ply, Inc.
12
This contract contained an option provision whereby the state
might extend the duration of the purchase agreement for succes-
sive one year periods to a maximum of three years beyond the
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See text accompanying notes 49-57 infra.
11. Merriam-Webster's International Dictionary (3d ed. 1964), de-
fines practicable as (possible to practice or perform: capable of
being put into practice, done, or accomplished: feasible.
The word feasible is defined in the same dictionary as 'capa-
ble of being done, executed, or effected: possible of realization...
capable of being managed, utilized, or dealt with successfully.'
Accepting these dictionary definitions as the ordinary meaning
of the term and applying them now in the term's statutory context,
it appears that practicable means a practice that is feasible, or a
procedure capable of being put into practice. Thus, if an under-
taking is possible to practice or perform or is capable of attain-
ment or accomplishment, it is practicable.
Miller v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 790, 793-4, 440 P.2d 840, 842-3 (1968).
12. Savage v. State, 75 Wash. 2d 663, -, 453 P.2d 613, 614 (1969).
Note
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original one year term.18 The sole contention of the plaintiff-tax-
payers 14 in the resultant declaratory judgment action was that the
option to extend the contract term was a violation of the com-
petitive bidding statute.15 The trial court agreed and entered
summary judgment declaring the option provision void and en-
joined the state and the Director of General Administration from
exercising the option. On appeal by the state, the Supreme Court
of Washington in a 5-4 decision reversed the judgment of the trial
court and concluded that the contract was in compliance with the
applicable competitive bidding requirements. 6
A. Option Held Valid
The majority view in Savage was that an option to extend a
contract neither constitutes a negotiation nor creates successive
new contracts but, rather, merely extends the duration of a single
existing contract. 17 A second element offered in support of the
majority conclusion was that there are no statutory requirements
limiting the time or duration of a purchase contract. The majority
opinion expressed the view that the Director of General Adminis-
tration made a valid determination that it was in the best interests
of the state to protect against a price increase by obtaining a lim-
ited and specific option to extend the initial one year contract.
The court decided that the essential terms of any state purchase
contract must be left to the determination of the administrative
officer or agency involved with the letting thereof, subject, of
course, to judicial review for unreasonableness or abuse of dis-
cretion.18 The court then concluded that a maximum possibility of
13. The language of the contract which is at issue provides:
Contract Dates: This contract shall be for a period commencing
on the 1st day of January, 1966, and terminated on the 31st day
of December, 1966. Extensions: Bidder and Division of Pur-
chasing covenant and agree that this contract may, at the sole
option of the State of Washington, be extended under the same
terms and conditions of this contract for a period not to exceed one
additional year, and said option to extend this contract for a one
year period shall be in effect thereafter for a total not exceeding
three additional years.
Savage v. State, 75 Wash. 2d 663, -, 453 P.2d 613, 614 (1969).
14. The plaintiff-taxpayers in this action are identical to those in
Miller.
15. Statute cited note 7 supra.
16. Savage v. State, 75 Wash. 2d at -, 453 P.2d at 616 (1969).
17. Savage v. State, 75 Wash. 2d 663, -, 453 P.2d 613, 615 (1969);
see Helena Light & Ry. v. Northern Pac. By., 57 Mont. 93, 186 P. 702 (1920);
State ex rel. Preston v. Ferguson, 170 Ohio St. 450, 166 N.E.2d 365 (1960);
17A C.J.S. Contracts § 449 (1963).
18. Pittman Constr. Co. v. Housing Auth., 167 F. 9upp. 517 (W.D. La.
four years is not an unreasonable length of time for the state to
contract for its lamp and starter needs.19  Finally, since all
bidders had an equal opportunity to respond to the department's
invitation to bid on the terms as specified and advertised includ-
ing the one to four year variable duration option, the majority
concluded that no violation of competitive bidding requirements
had occurred.
B. Option Viewed as a Violation
The minority of the Savage court chose not to apply the tech-
nical rule of contract law invoked by the majority which treats the
exercise of an option to extend as a continued existence of the
original contract rather than the formation of a new contract.
20
The well reasoned dissent written by Judge Hale, the author
of the Miller opinion, raised a number of arguments to show the
invalidity of the extension option clause. The dissent reasoned
that state exercise of the extension option is a renewal and, there-
fore, equivalent to a non-competitive negotiation of a new contract.
In view of the mandatory requirement of the statute2' and the
fact that the instance under consideration did not fall within one
of the stated exceptions, the minority urged that the extension
clause violated the basic purpose of the bidding requirement. The
situation which could arise from the exercise of the option was
said to present an opportunity for impropriety even if no wrong was
actually committed, since no notice would be given to the public
that an extension was being entered into at the end of the one
year contract period. Another supplier might be in a position
after the first year to offer a better price than initially accepted by
the state. However, since the exercise of the extension option
need not be publicly disclosed, the public could be denied the low-
est available price. Another shortcoming in the extension option
system noted by the court is that it confers unlimited discretion
in the administrative officer making the decision to extend. The
officer could choose to extend even though the contractor's per-
formance during the first year were substandard or other con-
tractors were now in a position to offer a better price.
A second dissent dealt with the effective realities of the ex-
tension method used by the state in letting the new contract. It
pointed out that under the 1958 contract discussed in Miller, the
1958), aff'd, 264 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1959); Litemore Elec. Co. v. Kawecki,
48 Misc. 347, 265 N.Y.S.2d 29 (Sup. Ct. 1965); State ex rel. Democrat Print-
ing Co. v. Schmiege, 18 Wis. 2d 325, 118 N.W.2d 845 (1963).
19. See Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Ranken, 34 Del. Ch. 439, 105 A.2d
614 (1954) for a general discussion on the reasonableness of long term
public contracts.
20. Savage v. State, 75 Wash. 2d 663, -, 453 P.2d 613, 618 (1969)
(dissenting opinion).
21. Statute cited note 7 supra.
Note
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state was charged in excess of the best price available by the
same contractor involved in the present case. The present con-
tract was suggested to be an attempt by the Department of Gen-
eral Administration to negate the holding of Miller and yet accom-
plish the same illegal purpose. Finally, the second dissent con-
tended that the possibility of the contract lasting for one, two,
three or four years results in the state receiving an unfavorable
price:
Under these circumstances, knowing that they might be
bound on a 4-year contract and foreseeing that they are
in a period of rising prices and costs, the bidder would
naturally attempt to average out the anticipated percent-
age of increase for an item on a 4-year basis. Thus the
bid for the first year contract would necessarily be greater
than it would have been if the bid were for a 1 year period.
As I read the statute, this method of bidding is contrary
tn its intent and does result in an initially higher sales
price for light bulbs.
22
IV. MAJOR ASPECTS OF STATE PURCHASE CONTRACTING
A. General Considerations
Basically public contracts resemble private contracts, in that
the contracting governmental body subjects itself to the principles
of general contract law.23 However, in many respects public con-
tract law is unique. "A private contract is one between inddi-
viduals only and affects only private rights; a public contract is
one to which the state is a party, and which concerns all its cit-
izens."
24
The initial inquiry in determining whether a state purchasing
contract is valid is whether the state agency entering into the
agreement had the power to carry out such a transaction. Such
authority may be inherent, expressed, or implied, but the existence
of some valid power to contract is a prerequisite.
25
The next consideration to be given a state contract is whether
the requisite formalities involved in making such a contract have
22. Savage v. State, 75 Wash. 2d 663, -, 453 P.2d 613, 619 (1969)
(dissenting opinion).
23. Clark County Constr. Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 248 Ky.
158, 58 S.W.2d 388 (1933). See generally W.H. RiEmER, HANDBOOK OP
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT ADmNISTRATION 14-15 (1968).
24. People ex rel. Weed-Parsons Printing Co. v. Palmer, 14 Misc. 41,
35 N.Y.S. 222 (Sup. Ct. 1895); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 10 (1963).
25. United States v. McDougall's Adm'r, 121 U.S. 89 (1887); Dallas
County v. MacKenzie, 94 U.S. 660 (1876); Forth Worth Cavalry Club v.
Sheppard, 125 Tex. 339, 83 S.W.2d 660 (1935).
been substantially fulfilled. In many aspects, these formalities
are provided as a means to protect the public interest. While
many of these public safeguards are applicable to the entire range of
governmental contracts, 26 this discussion will concentrate upon
their use in purchasing contracts.
Contracts for purchases of materials and supplies differ from
other public contracts in several key respects. While the costs of
government procurement and purchasing increase steadily2' cor-
responding to increases in government activity, the immediate out-
lay at any one time is normally within the fiscal means of the
state and so does not require the issuance of bonds as do many
other public works contracts. 2 In fact, for materials and supplies,
as distinguished from equipment, expenditures must normally be
met out of current revenues.2 9 It must be remembered, however,
that in the case of purchases of supplies, delivery will normally
extend over a significant period of time thus raising a continuing
inspection problem to determine compliance with the contract
specifications.
One well recognized precept safeguarding the public interest
is that fraud or collusion in the awarding of a contract by public
authority will make the contract void.3 0 Another long estab-
lished principle prohibits the expenditure of public funds on any-
thing except a public purpose. A principle which arose origin-
26. Public contracts can be categorized in four basic groups. First
are the contracts for the construction or repair of buildings, roads, recrea-
tional facilities and other major public projects. The second group is com-
prised of the various purchasing contracts for supplies and equipment. The
third type of public contract is for the supplying of various required
services. Generally, services which can be classed as commercial such as
printing and maintenance are subject to bidding requirements, while
personal and professional services are often excepted. For an excellent
discussion of the personal service exception see Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 733
(1967). The fourth type of contract is for research and development
which may combine elements of each of the three prior categories. While
state governments have not been involved with this type of contract to any
great extent in the past, it is reasonable to expect that the campaign to
eliminate pollution of our atmosphere and waters may result in widespread
adoption of such arrangements. At any rate, the federal government has
for many years made extensive use of this type of contract, particularly in
the defense field. An early and leading case on research and develop-
ment contracts is Carnegie Steel Co. v. United States, 240 U.S. 156 (1916).
For an in depth treatment of the entire area see 9 J. McBRums & I.
WAc TEL, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS § 53 (1969).
27. The total amount expended by state and local governments for the
procurement of goods and services rose from $40.1 billion in 1960 to $97.2
billion in 1968. U.S. BUREAu OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
Uxrins STATES; 1969, at 312 (90th ed. 1969).
28. See generally Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701
(1883).
29. See, e.g., Ellison v. Oliver, 147 Ark. 252, 227 S.W. 586 (1921);
WASH. Rzv. CoD ANN. § 43.88.130 (1965).
30. McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639 (1899); Otter Tail Power Co.
v. Village of Wheaton, 235 Minn. 123, 49 N.W.2d 804 (1951).
Note
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ally from judicial interpretation but which has since frequently
been voiced in constitutions and legislation is the bar against pre-
venting government officers from having any connection with the
awarding of governmental contracts in which they have a personal
interest.3 1 The rationale of this prohibition lies in the inherent
conflict between private interest and public obligation.
32
B. Competitive Bidding
The most important means of protecting the public interest
in the realm of state purchase contracts is the use of competitive
bidding and award to the lowest responsible bidder.
The obvious purpose of competitive bidding is to avoid "favor-
itism, improvidence, extravagance, fraud and corruption, and to
secure the best work or supplies at the lowest price practicable."3 3
In order to best accomplish these aims, it is desirable to enact
the requirements in a broad policy statement constitutionally and
also in considerable detail statutorily since the common law rule
called for invalidation of the contract only upon a showing of
fraud or corruption.
3 4
Requirements for competitive bidding in state contracts are
found in all states, although the nature and extent of such pro-
visions vary greatly from state to state 5 While the require-
31. See cases cited at 43 AM. JUR. Public Works and Contracts § 14
(1942).
32. See generally Hanes & Smith, The Contracting Officer: His Au-
thority to Act and his Duty to Act Independently, 70 DICK. L. REV. 333
(1966).
33. 10 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MuNICi'AL CORPORATIONS 321 (3d
ed. 1966).
34. State ex rel. Flowers v. Kelley, 214 F. Supp. 745 (M.D. Ala. 1963),
aff'd, 339 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1964).
35. ALA. CONST. art. 4, § 69; ALA. CODE tit. 55, §§ 494-512 (Supp.
1967); ALASKA STAT. § 37.05.230 (Supp. 1969); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 35-131-13 (Supp. 1969); ARK. CoNsT. art. 19, § 15; ARm. STAT. ANN. § 14-
205 (1968); CAL. GOVT CODE § 14807 (West Supp. 1969); COLO CONST.
art. V, § 29; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-4-3 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 4-112 (Supp. 1969); DEL. CONST. art. XV, § 8; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29,
§ 6904 (Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 287.081 (1962); GA. CONST. § XVII;
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 1409, 1410 (1957); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 103-22 (1968);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-1608 (Supp. 1967); ILL. CONST. art. IV, §§ 15, 25;
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 132 (Supp. 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-501
(1964); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-3739 (Supp. 1968); Ky. CONST. § 247; Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.070 (1963); LA. CONST. art. 3, § 30; LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 38:2211 (1968); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 1816 (1964); MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 7, § 22 (1966); MIcH. CONST. art. V, § 25; MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 16.07 (1946); Miss. CONST. art. 4, § 107; Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 34.040 (1969); MONT. CONST. art. V, § 30; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 82-
ment of competitive bidding is often so expressed, some other states
require that contracts be awarded to the "best bidder," "lowest
responsible bidder" or "lowest and best bidder" each of which
presupposes the completion of a round of competitive bidding
prior to the award.83
As will be discussed later,37 not all contracts are suitable
for award by competitive bidding. This limitation, however,
should not be interpreted to mean that it is undesirable to adopt
in every state a broad and mandatory statutory scheme of com-
petitive bidding which provides the proper and applicable ex-
ceptions from the general requirement.3 ' Such a statute would
certainly create a less confusing standard than the typical one
present in the Washington statute,3 9 discussed in both Miller and
Savage, which requires competitive bidding only "insofar as practi-
cable."
An advertising requirement exists under most competitive bid
systems.4 0 The advertising requirement is designed to assure that
all persons qualified4' and desirous of bidding be given an adequate
and an equal opportunity to be informed that the public body
proposes to enter into a contract. In the absence of specific
requirements as to the manner of advertising, competitive bidding
necessitates "that a reasonable notice be given of the letting of
public contracts in order that by competition in bidding, the pub-
lic may receive the benefit of the greatest possible value of the
1913 (1966); NE. CONST. art. III, § 16; NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-161 (1966);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 333.300 (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8:19 (Supp.
1967); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 52:34 (1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 6-5-26
(Supp. 1969); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 174 (McKinney Supp. 1969); N.C.
GE. STAT. § 143-52 (1964); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 125.14 (Baldwin
1964); OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 23; OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 22 (Supp. 1969);
ORE. CONST. art. IX, § 8; ORE. REV. STAT. § 279.714 (1968); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 71, § 639 (1962); S.D. CODE § 55.2805 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 12-305
(1955); TEx. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 18, 21; TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 664-3
(1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-29 (1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 953
(Supp. 1969); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-275 (1966); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 43.19.1906 (1965); W. VA. CONST. art. 6, §§ 15, 34; W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 5A-3-11 (1966); Wis. CONST. art. IV, § 25, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 16.75
(Supp. 1969); WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 31; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-375 (1957).
36. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 14807 (West Supp. 1969).
37. See text accompanying notes 52-61 infra.
38. H. JAMES, THE PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN PUBLIC
CONTRACTS 14 (1946).
39. Statute cited note 7 supra.
40. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 40-1409 (1957) which provides in part
that "sealed bids shall be solicited by advertisement in a newspaper of
state-wide circulation."
41. Among the various factors considered in making the determination
of a bidder's qualification are whether he (1) is a manufacturer or regular
dealer; (2) has adequate financial resources or ability to secure such re-
sources; (3) is able to comply with the required delivery or performance
schedule (taking into consideration all existing business commitments);
and (4) has a satisfactory record of performance and integrity. G. CuNEo,
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS HANDBOOK 20-21 (1962).
Note
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least expenditure. '42  The test of reasonableness of the notice
must, of course, vary with the circumstances of the particular
contract contemplated. To achieve the goal of informing both the
general public and prospective bidders there must be concern for
use of the proper media for sufficient time and with sufficient
frequency.
43
No less important than the requirement of adequate advertising
is the need for definite specifications providing all bidders with
the nature of the proposed contract so as to enter intelligent bids.
4
The exact method by which the specifications are made available
to the public and to the bidders will again vary depending on the
circumstances of the individual contract. The best approach
would be to include the exact specifications in the advertised no-
tice, and often in state purchase contracts, where the commodity
sought is readily identifiable, such inclusion in advertising is con-
ceivable.
45
Another aspect involved in government purchasing is the pro-
hibition against contract splitting. Contracting officers who do en-
gage in such conduct are attempting to evade the requirements of
competitive bidding by dividing an integral purchase into two or
more transactions, each of which falls below the minimum figure
at which formal bidding procedures become mandatory.46 While
this practice is often not easy to detect, particularly if the sub-
purchases are made at respectable intervals, courts will not toler-
ate it when uncovered.
47
Deposits to insure faithful performance are often required with
the entrance of the bid48 since an action for damages will ordinarily
be unavailing in the event of substandard or non-performance.4 9
The amount and form of the deposit will again vary with the cir-
cumstances of the particular contract.
The final aspects in the competitive bid process are the formal-
42. Reiter v. Chapman, 177 Wash. 392, 397, 31 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1934).
43. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 287.081 (1962) which requires that the
notice be published regularly for two weeks prior to the opening of bids.
44. Flynn Constr. Co. v. Leininger, 125 Okla. 197, 257 P. 375 (1927).
45. James v. Humphrey, 226 Ark. 325, 289 S.W.2d 691 (1956).
46. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 499 (Supp. 1967) which provides in
part: "No purchase or contract shall be divided into parts . . . for the
purpose of avoiding the requirements of this chapter."
47. State v. Kollarik, 22 N.J. 558, 126 A.2d 875 (1956); Yohe v. City
of Burrell, 418 Pa. 23, 208 A.2d 847 (1965); Fonder v. City of Lower South
Sioux Falls, 76 S.D. 31, 71 N.W.2d 618 (1955).
48. See cases cited at 81 C.J.S. States § 118 n.20 (Supp. 1969).
49. Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Alpena, 238 Mich. 164, 213 N.W.
93 (1927).
ities attached to the bid itself. The public interest would appear
best protected by a requirement that all bids be in writing to
guarantee an equal basis for comparison. 0 Written bidding also
offers the advantage of forming a permanent record against which
the performance of the successful bidder could later be judged.
A requirement that the written bids be sealed also acts as a pub-
lic safeguard by preventing a premature disclosure which would
destroy the equality of bidding opportunity.
51
C. Common Exceptions to Competitive Bidding
In light of the fact that competitive bidding acts to protect the
interests of the general public, the range of exceptions to the pro-
cedure should be restricted. Further, whatever exceptions are
to be made should be enumerated in the statutes governing
the bidding and not left to the discretion of the awarding officer
as to the feasibility or practicability of bidding in any particular
purchase.
52
The amount involved in the purchase contract is often the de-
termining factor in whether an exception to the bidding pro-
cedure exists. While every contract could by statute be made to
fall within the bidding requirements, this would be wasteful and
inefficient for purchases involving relatively small amounts of
money. The minimum in effect presently varies throughout the
states from a low of $5053 to a high of $400054 for purchase con-
tracts.
A second exception from bidding is the case of an emergency
situation in which the immediate public need for procurement of
the item outweighs the advantage to be gained by delaying to
observe the formalities.55 The question that arises in connec-
tion with this exception is what are the limits on the discretion of
the contracting officer to determine when such an emergency
exists.M6
50. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.070 (1963) which requires
written and sealed bids on all purchases over $300.
51. rd.
52. See, e.g., NE. REV. STAT. § 81-161.03 (1966) which vests complete
discretion in that state's Purchasing Agent to omit bidding in any case.
53. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 1816 (1964).
54. HAWAII REV. LAWS § 103-22 (1968).
55. Statute cited note 7 supra. See generally 10 E. McQUILLIN, THE
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 343 (3d ed. 1966).
56. The State of Illinois has attempted to limit the discretion of the
awarding officer to involve the emergency exception in the following
manner:
Where funds are expended in an emergency by purchase, con-
tract or otherwise, however, the person or persons authorizing the
expenditure shall file an affidavit with the Auditor General of the
State of Illinois within 10 days after the purchase or contract
setting forth the conditions and circumstances requiring the emer-
gency purchase. The Auditor General shall file with the Legisla-
Note
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A third common exception provides that bidding requirements
may be waived when the item sought is available only from a
single supplier. 7 This exceptional situation can be further compli-
cated when a patented article is expressly listed in the contract
specifications.
5 8
The final exception that is sometimes provided for in the laws
controlling state purchase contracts allows the contract to be let
without bidding after there has been a round of bidding in which
either no bids were submitted or in which all bids were rejected. 9
There are several instances in which all bids could be rejected as
when all are deemed to be too high6" or when no "responsible" l
bidder competes.
V. SAVAGE REvisiTm
The majority opinion in Savage v. State6 2 by distinguishing an
option to renew from an option to extend relied on the rule set
forth in Helan Light & Ry. v. Northern Pac. Ry.63 that an option to
renew would be considered as the right to require the execution of
a new contract while an option to extend operates as a right to
require continuation of the original contract. In the Helena case,
the contract provided that the railway company reserved the
right "to renew the same contract for an additional period of 5
years."64 While this language would ordinarily create an option
to renew, the Helena court held it to be an option to extend so as
to avoid the effect of a regulating public utility statute that had
been enacted subsequent to the formation of the original contract
but prior to the renewal. The reluctance of the Helena court to
apply the ordinary meaning rule in construing the word "renew"
is explained by looking "to the reading of the entire contract,
tive Audit Commission and the Governor, at the end of each fiscal
quarter, a complete listing of all emergency purchases and con-
tracts reported to him during that fiscal quarter. The Legislative
Audit Commission shall comment upon that listing in its annual
report to the General Assembly.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 132.6(a) (3) (Supp. 1969).
57. See, e.g., statute cited note 7 supra.
58. See generally G. CUNEO, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS HANDBOOK 75
(1962); 9 J. McBRDE & I. WACHTEL, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS § 52 (1969);
Rotondi, Government Competitive Procurement and Patent Infringement:
Substance and Solution, 27 FED. B.J. 325 (1967).
59. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 16.75 (1969).
60. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE FIN. LAw § 174 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
61. See discussion note 41 supra.
62. 75 Wash. 2d 663, 453 P.2d 613 (1969).
63. 57 Mont. 93, 186 P. 702 (1920).
64. Id. at 100, 186 P. at 703 (1920).
and to the practical construction given to it by the parties them-
selves, rather than to the phraseology used.""5  Therefore, the
rule stated in the Helena decision and relied on by the majority of
the court in Savage is somewhat modified. The general circum-
stances surrounding the entire contract would appear to be deter-
minative of whether or not a particular option clause is for re-
newal or extension rather than the language used. In that regard,
the majority in Savage should have looked to the circumstances
surrounding the contract rather than the language used to deter-
mine the nature of the option clause in question. Had this been
done, the majority could have held that the clause provided an
option to renew despite the use of extension language and that
the renewal provision was invalid pursuant to the holding in
Miller v. State.
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It is submitted that the views offered by the dissenting opin-
ions are the proper ones. Competitive bidding requirements are
enacted, as has been discussed, to protect the public interest. In
this regard, the bidding requirement should be Construed so as to
encompass as many state contracting situations as possible. The
technical contract distinction between renewal and extension, made
by the majority of the Washington Supreme Court, resulted in a
decision which is inconsistent with the earlier holding in Miller
and in direct conflict with the policy underlying the competitive
bidding procedures which have been considered.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ideally, each state should enact statutes governing the field
of state purchase contracting which reflect detailed and complete
consideration of all of the aspects discussed. The thoroughness
with which these points are covered presently varies from state
to state. However, all states do adhere to the general policy of
protecting the public interest by means of interpreting the re-
quirements of competitive bidding, no matter how scant the re-
quirements may be, to include as many contracts as possible.
Applying this approach, it would appear that the decision in Savage
was erroneous and inconsistent with the court's earlier holding in
Miller. In as much as the extension option represents state con-
tracting without adherence to competitive bidding requirements,
contracts containing such a clause should be invalidated.
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65. Id. at 106, 186 P. at 705 (1920).
66. 73 Wash. 2d 790, 440 P.2d 840 (1968).
